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against the devastating projectiles hurled from the huge guns, the products of human ingenuity and industry. It is to be hoped that when the storm of war has passed away and the nations of the world are again able to take up their interrupted march toward the goals of social, scientific, artistic and industrial progress and aspiration, the terrible lessons taught by the war will not have been learned in vain, but will serve as incentives to provide adequate safeguards for the future. If, as we scarcely dare to believe, an era of peace and good will follows the close of the bitter conflict, the action in common for the preservation of the historic and art treasures of the world will help on the good work.

PREPAREDNESS—SOME SUGGESTIONS

By ARTHUR WILLIAMS

NEW YORK CITY

THOSE interested in the preservation of that which connects us with the past in art, literature and architecture, look upon the unnecessary destruction of the museums, churches, monuments and historical structures, that is being wrought in Europe, with a degree of regret and horror which can not be easily expressed. Loss of such buildings as the Hôtel de Ville at Louvain, the Cloth Hall at Ypres, the Hôtel de Ville at Arras, such a marvel of architecture as the Rheims Cathedral, or the destruction of such valuable manuscripts and volumes as those housed by the University at Louvain, are calamities to be lamented in the conservation of art and learning. In New York City alone, who could measure the damage resulting from the destruction of such buildings as those of the American Museum of Natural History, the American Museum of Art, the American Museum of Safety, the New York Public Library and many others? Every one must view with apprehension any condition through which our educational and historical structures would be the subject of possible destruction through the attack of an enemy. This would be particularly so if that calamity should be the result of evident unpreparedness, after all the warnings we have received through the conditions existing in the countries now at war.

A program which is distinctly confined to the defensive side of warfare is not necessarily one which would be immediately capable of an effectively offensive campaign. That is to say, the essential elements in a defensive program, where the clearly defined objectives are defensive, do not necessarily equip one for effective offensive action. Preparation for defense could be utilized for an offensive, and places material at our disposal for an offensive movement much more quickly

than were we without our defensive preparation. But the two objectives are opposed to each other and simply because our country places itself in a position for an effective defense is not a reason to fear that we would more readily be apt to give offense to others or become here, as was the case in Europe, an "armed camp" and a nation of "military men."

Our entire attitude should be one of effective defense, on both land and sea, of each of the states, of our foreign possessions, so long as they remain under our control, and in addition should afford adequate protection to our citizens abroad. The present conditions in Europe show that any failure on our part to provide adequate defense would be most short-sighted and wholly inconsistent with the demands of the country. This is probably the feeling of the great majority of the American people. The conviction can be little short of unanimous that in the last analysis behind any treaty or agreement we must have a military and naval organization of a defensive character that could adequately meet the offensive from any probable or possible enemy or combination of enemies.

Adequate military preparation takes years. This is true not only of ships, guns and other machines, but of human beings, upon whom to the last degree the result must depend. Preparation must include ships of varying degrees, arms and munitions, clothing, housing, equipment and the fullest needs of the commissary and the medical departments. Some of the preparation may consist of a latent ability to produce quickly and well; some must consist of an existing equipment in all of these departments ready for practically instantaneous use.

The seventeen years that have elapsed since the Spanish war have at least partly eliminated some of the lessons of that war. Very few understand the extent to which we were unprepared, even for a power so relatively weak as Spain. Our lack of material then went even so far that the authorities were without cables to mine our harbors, or mines to protect them, or explosives with which to charge the mines. We were without a need so fundamental as search lamps; the government had none, the manufacturers were out of supplies and it was necessary to secure the promise of a loan of such lamps from those who had them. We were without equipment in our commissary departments and the ultimate provisions even were a blot upon the administration of the country; and as for sanitation, even of the most elementary character, no such thing was known in any practical sense.

We were without men for our forts, without men to instruct others how to operate our coast defenses. The available trained men of the army were but a handful, and hundreds or thousands were needed where but one was available. Had our war been with one of the first-class powers, many of our coast cities would have been destroyed and landings could have been effected. That our nation would be conquered by

any country, however great, is not to be supposed for a moment; but that vast properties would be destroyed and hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of men "killed, injured or missing" included in our daily lists before a satisfactory result could be reached, would have been then part of the price of foolish unpreparedness, just as it would be part of the price to-day.

Many plans have been proposed and probably upon no plan do all minds meet. About an adequate navy there seems to be no difference of opinion, except possibly in the definition of the term "adequate." Unless we have a navy equal to that of any other country with which we may be at war, naval equality will be an impossibility, and, dealing with a superior force, certainly, in the absence of miracles, we must concede defeat at sea. Nothing is gained by assuming a strength we do not possess. If our navy is inferior to that of England, the English in the event of war could obtain the supremacy of the seas and our sea commerce would cease. This would be a serious matter only from the standpoint of retaining our foreign possessions and of protecting our commerce. The determining factor here would seem to be whether the country wants to go to the expense of being at all times reasonably sure of holding its possessions and of protecting its sea commerce. Apart from the question of patriotism and national pride, does the one equal the other? In the absence of such adequate provision, we could retain our foreign possessions and our sea commerce only so long as another nation with its own navy, or a combination of nations with their navies, permitted us to do so.

Apart from this question of size, all will agree that the country should possess an adequate navy, whatever may be accepted finally as the definition of this term. Such a navy should include dreadnaughts and super-dreadnaughts, at one end of the line, and submarines and transports, at the other end. One of the lessons of the Spanish war was the necessity for transports and one of the serious difficulties for a time was that of transporting equipment, munitions and men. Transports—a term which here is used as being inclusive of colliers for coaling our vessels at sea or at distant points—may be obtained either through a fleet maintained solely for that purpose by the government, lying idle and depreciating rapidly in times of peace, or by the upbuilding of a large merchant marine through private resources, as in England, which would be immediately available for the needs of the government in the event of war. Those who were in England when the war first broke out will appreciate far more than can those who remained at home, the enormous value of having a large merchant marine immediately available for transport and other service. Of course, the regular service of passengers and their baggage was interrupted, but this counted little, in comparison with the disadvantages of carrying for years a great unused

fleet of equal size, and the consequent commercial interruption was one which in any event would have occurred very largely as one of the results of the war.

The defense of our homes and our country is essentially different, however, from the defense of our foreign possessions or the protection of our commerce. Here our very liberties would be at stake and our entire population, instead of a small percentage, would be endangered. And if this larger percentage were sacrificed the smaller would follow, whereas if the smaller were lost for the time being the preservation of the larger would eventually care for the smaller. Adequate defense begins probably with the mining of our harbors and our shore defenses. These would prevent destructive attacks and landing. Behind these should be available for immediate use an armed force of moderate size and behind this a force capable of being quickly mustered and armed, of practically unlimited size in reference to our population. It is conceivable that the time may come when every one capable of bearing arms will be called upon for defensive action.

The operation of large and small guns in the fortifications and the planting and control of mines calls for a minimum force technically trained and capable of instructing others who in the event of emergency would be enrolled for their assistance. An organization should be maintained at all times sufficient to man our fortifications at a minimum and sufficient to instruct any numbers added for the adequate operation of the defenses, however long an offensive attack might continue.

While the effectiveness of the submarine has been more fully demonstrated than ever before, some question remains concerning its relative value. About mines, however, as an element of defense, no question can exist. We have yet to hear of the failure of any mined defense.

Another technically trained force maintained at a minimum and in constant service should be that necessary to operate a fleet of aerial craft of all the types which have been shown to be effective during the present hostilities. Some doubt may remain at the moment as to the effectiveness of aerial attacks upon fortified places, but no question would seem to exist concerning their indispensability as a means of reconnaissance and for guarding against an enemy's attacks from the air. It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that without aerial defense such a city as Paris could be wrecked by the bombs of an enemy dropped from flying machines. A permanent corps capable of immediate and effective action and of instructing others on a greatly broadened scale, should be in the constant service of the country.

Automobiles, for transportation and for carrying warfare directly into the lines of the enemy, are increasingly important as military factors. This is another field in which the country should have adequate reserves available for immediate use and producing capacities

which would insure a supply, full and adequate, on very short notice. The standing force devoted to this purpose need not be so large relatively as that for defense, but the technique should be understood and the means of quick development should be always at the disposal of those in charge of our government.

The manufacture of guns and explosives perhaps falls into two classes. For the normal needs of commerce and the government it might well be that to a large extent, if not entirely, these supplies could be obtained from private manufacturers. Their capacity for manufacture and delivery would be a factor in preparedness. Behind this capacity and supplementing it, the government should be at all times prepared to manufacture equipment and explosives. This capacity for manufacture could probably consist of instructors and machinery, with a minimum of those technically informed in the work—one of those national resources or reserves of no value in times of peace, but of paramount importance in the event of war.

It is essential that we have a commissary plant capable of providing full service to a minimum of from half a million to a million men. That is to say, the mobilization of that number of men should be accomplished with an equally rapid mobilization of equipment and supplies necessary for their shelter and food. Behind this we should know that we have plant-capacity for turning out added equipment as rapidly as men could be mobilized, so that at no time should even a single company of soldiers go into camp or into the field without adequate commissary always within reaching distance.

Equal precautions should be taken with regard to the sanitary side of camp and trench life. Materials required should be immediately available for a minimum force and all the essentials should be so well understood that adequate sanitary provision would be made for every group of men the moment they are mobilized and put into active service. Never again should we have the blot of Tampa or Montauk Point on our military activities.

Chemistry is playing a part in this war which was heretofore unsuspected. For years, even before the Spanish war, it has been understood that the machine and the engineer would be great factors in modern warfare. But the chemist was given a place altogether too unimportant. All that is known in the use of and protection against poisonous gases or any other similar means of offensive action should be at the disposal of our authorities and all that the future may reveal should be placed immediately at their disposal. We should never go into action handicapped by a lack of knowledge concerning the offensive or defensive possibilities of explosives or chemicals or gases. Ignorance is no excuse for wounded, blinded or dead men, or for a defeat.

Individual equipment of each man for active service is another ele-

ment for which careful provision should be made. If we have a standing army of a quarter of a million men, its equipment would naturally be always at hand. And so for the additional army or armies which might be required to meet an enemy, equal equipment, individually complete, should now be provided. If we think a million men should be ready on short call for adequate defense, we should have a million complete equipments ready for instantaneous use for man and horse. In being thus prepared, we would be saved such pathetic sights as young men in civilian clothes marching up and down the streets of London or drilling in squads in the public places and parks, in their civilian clothes, carrying wooden sticks, to imitate guns, and other articles bound together to represent about the average load of a marching soldier. A minimum equipment should be immediately available and the means for providing enough additional equipment as men are assembled should be always at the service of the government.

Behind all this lies the preparation of the human machine, which to any needed extent should be capable of immediate assembly. The problem is how this is to be attained without turning our country into an armed camp or leading us to a distinctly military existence. The only way to secure this result would seem to be through the education of our older boys and our young men, say, between the ages of fourteen and twenty, in the elementary features of military life. These should include shooting and a knowledge of handling small arms; of marching and of living in camps and in trenches; of so approaching and retreating from an enemy as to make the most of either artificial objects—such as “digging in”—or natural objects for self-defense; of camp and trench life, including cooking and the elementary features of camp sanitation. The objective of this training would be to have the vast and growing body of men, who, with little more training than that necessary to fit them for the open, would be immediately available for any protective effort against the attacks of an enemy.

It would seem that this training must be conducted in such a way that it will reach every growing boy and will place at his disposal every means of acquiring this kind of information now at the disposal of our state and national governments. The present method of training state militia, whereby men can enter the regiments only by some form of social selection, and there remain year after year long after their periods of usefulness have expired, is obsolete and calls for early discardment. As a substitute, our armories should be open to all, exactly as our schools are open to all, and their use to any one individual should be limited to a certain period of time, say, one, two or three years, within which the necessary military training could be obtained. If it were two years, the second term men would be available for military service; or if

for three years, the third term men, supplemented by the second or first year men, in the event of emergency, as the circumstances might justify.

Probably the men who have seen even the smallest part of camp life or military service are the best safeguards we have against war. Those who merely observed the results of the early days of the war in Europe would do all that lies in their power to prevent a repetition of the European conditions in our own country. If this be true, this form of training, added to the hardships of camp life and military service, would seem to act as a deterrent and not an incentive towards war.

Military training leads to better physique and better physical condition; it adds a degree of discipline, which many observers think would improve our American standards; it is a desirable kind of education; it improves personal hygiene; it undoubtedly leads to higher standards of health and of living.

The subject is one which should be approached calmly and without hysteria. The lessons of the Spanish war and the conditions prevailing in Europe, however, warn us that adequate defense preparation is essential and that no time should be lost. Those who represent our government should take the country into its confidence, they should proceed broadly and, in this, eliminating all politics, may expect the unanimous backing and support of the country.

We must have a plan which will include a knowledge of what we have got, of what we can get, to what extent and in what time. It must include technical organizations, each complete with a minimum of equipment and trained men. It should include the best possible combination of government and privately owned resources for all purposes, from an adequate fleet of both a primary and a secondary nature to the provision of munitions, and equipment in any required extent. Distinction is made between an active and a latent producing capacity; the two should be separately considered, the plan of each effectively accomplishing its intended objective. And, finally, whatever may be the method adopted, we must have an unlimited citizen-reserve capable of getting quickly on the firing line, and behind this a reserve backing up those on the firing line without delay with every detail perfected of efficient and modern supplies.

Perfection of such a plan and organization would prevent rather than encourage us in seeking differences with other nations and would give us that degree of preparedness which is called for in the defense of our country, our institutions and our homes and the lives of our women, our children and our non-combatants.